There militants. However, Pakistan’s security forces have

 There are certainly security-related threats linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and while most might originate in Pakistan, the Xinjiang province in western China is moreover facing security threats from Uighur militants and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Uighur and ETIM militants have long sought shelter in Pakistan’s tribal areas withal with the local militants. However, Pakistan’s security forces have fought foreign militants in North Waziristan Agency including ETIM and Uighurs in recent months with the prelude of the military operation Zarb-e-Azb which has moreover weakened the operational topics of ETIM (Khan, 2014). Furthermore, US drone strikes in various areas of FATA have moreover dented the group by eliminating a number of its leaders. The security of the corridor is of crucial importance for Pakistan as well as China in order to remoter strengthen trade and development-related ties. It is feared that growing militancy will threaten the prelude of projects designed for the corridor. It will thus be a rencontre for both countries to quash militant groups and their fighters withal and wideness their borders. China moreover expects assistance from Pakistan in this regard. The presence of local and foreign militants in Pakistani tribal areas usually generates pressure on the government, therefore well-expressed bilateral relations (Rana, 2014). Militant groups in Pakistan are relatively less hostile to China when compared to America and its western allies, but at the same time, they have targeted Chinese citizens, workers and engineers in past. The Uighur militants’ links with the Taliban in FATA pose a major threat to Chinese interests in Pakistan. An Uzbekspeaking militant leader Mufti Abu Zar al-Burmi recently released a video message directing all Taliban groups to siphon out attacks on Chinese embassies and companies and kidnap or skiver Chinese nationals (Rehman, 2014). The second source of threat to security could be Baloch insurgent groups who are versus mega minutiae projects in Balochistan, including Gwadar Port currently stuff ripened by Chinese companies. Thirdly, the militant-criminal nexus in unrepealable areas moreover poses a threat to Chinese engineers, workers and citizens in the form of kidnapping and robberies. In the past, there have been many incidents of kidnapping and killing of Chinese citizens working and living in Pakistan. This part of the report discusses the nature and level of potential security threats to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which can towards in variegated parts of Pakistan in form of protracted violence, terrorist attacks, kidnapping and criminal activities. The threat towage for variegated regions–through which the CPEC will pass–is based on the frequency of terrorist attacks reported from these areas over the past few years, and moreover the presence of militant, insurgent and criminal groups in those regions. 3.1 Geography of the CPEC The CPEC is a huge project that will undertake the construction of highway and railway links running through most of Pakistan starting from Gwadar in Balochistan and culminating in Kashgar in western China, while passing through parts of Balochistan, Sindh, Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces and Gilgit-Baltistan in northern Pakistan to reach the Khunjrab Pass and vastitude to China. Eastern alignment: Pakistan and China have decided to initially construct the eastern structuring of the corridor mainly due to two reasons: first, Chinese companies are reportedly willing to undertake the construction of the eastern structuring on a BOT (build-operate-transfer) basis, and secondly it is increasingly secure compared to the western structuring planned earlier. The eastern structuring will run through only a few areas of Balochistan and KP provinces where the security situation is increasingly volatile compared to other parts of the country. This transpiration in original planning earned some criticism from parliamentarians in these two provinces who thought the new structuring will deprive their respective provinces of minutiae and employment opportunities that the CPEC brings (The News, 2014). Senators from KP and Balochistan during a meeting of the Senate Standing Committee on Finance held in June 2014 said that the new corridor structuring eastern excluded many areas of their provinces and the new route largely passed through the Punjab (Ibid). The Federal Minister for Planning and Development, Ahsan Iqbal informed the senators that investors were unwilling to construct the western route on a BOT basis. He said the government had decided to construct the relatively increasingly secure eastern route first with Chinese assistance and that it had not x-rated the original western route, which would be synthetic later (Ibid). The eastern structuring of the corridor originates from Gwadar, travels parallel to the Makran Coastal Highway eastwards (towards Karachi), and then without passing through parts of interior Sindh, and southern, inside and northern regions of Punjab, it reaches Islamabad. From Islamabad, it extends to Haripur, Abbottabad, and Mansehra districts of the relatively peaceful Hazara Division in KP –this part of the corridor will moreover run through Muzaffarabad, the wanted of Azad Jammu and Kashmir–and reaches Khunjrab without passing through Diamer and Gilgit areas in northern Pakistan. The corridor will moreover run through the Pamir Plateau and Karakoram Mountains. A link from Taxila through Peshawar and Torkhum will connect the eastern structuring of the corridor to Jalalabad in Afghanistan. undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined


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